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B. Michael Bechthold 
In the climactic scene of the highly-acclaimed Saving Private Ryan, the beleaguered Ranger 
and Airborne forces of Captain John Miller (Tom 
Hanks) are about to be overrun. Against 
overwhelming odds they have fought to save a 
crucial stone bridge over the Merderet River. It 
is a losing battle. With defeat imminent, the 
Americans retreat across the bridge and prepare 
to blow it. However, before that can happen, 
Captain Miller is shot and is unable to detonate 
the explosives. As a German tank rumbles across 
the bridge it appears all is lost. Then, in typical 
Hollywood tradition, the cavalry arrives - two 
P-51 Mustangs. With uncanny timeliness and 
pinpoint accuracy they knock out the German 
tank on their first pass without destroying either 
the bridge or the American infantry who are mere 
yards away. 
Though this may be a fitting end to a very 
good movie, it is not representative of the 
capabilities of tactical air power, especially early 
in the Normandy campaign. Leaving aside the 
question of accuracy,1 the system of air support 
in place at the outset of the invasion was much 
too cumbersome to allow an intervention of this 
nature. The Americans went into Normandy with 
a system of Close Air Support (CAS) that was 
largely derived from the British experience in 
North Africa. It was based on the belief that 
centralized control of air assets was the most 
effective method of employment. However, 
following D-Day, the system in place was far too 
unwieldy to provide effect support. Over the next 
three months, most of the existing doctrine was 
effectively discarded. An air support organization 
emerged that was the complete antithesis to that 
with which the Americans had started. The 
system which evolved proved to be highly 
effective, flexible and able to adapt quickly to a 
variety of situations. 
The First Test: North Africa 
The Americans started the war with a basic grasp of the tenets of CAS. The air and 
ground forces talked of close cooperation, but in 
reality they remained far apart in their visions of 
tactical air support. The first serious American 
attempt at producing a modern, workable tactical 
air doctrine came in April 1942 with the 
publication of War Department Basic Field 
Manual 31-35, "Aviation in Support of the 
Ground Forces." This manual provided sound 
principles to guide future air-ground operations. 
Unfor tunate ly , FM 31-35 was to prove 
unsuccessful when given its baptism of fire in 
North Africa in late 1942. 
Operation "Torch," the Allied invasion of 
North Africa in November 1942, brought the 
problems of conducting effective air support 
operations to light. Many of the notions, tactics 
and equipment the Americans had brought to 
North Africa were found to be unworkable, 
outclassed or obsolete. Light bombers, for 
instance, expected to perform the majority of 
close support work, were found to be terribly 
vulnerable to German air and ground defences. 
An attempt to fill this unexpected gap with the 
use of fighters met with another difficulty. Most 
fighter pilots were not trained in ground strafing 
and their aircraft were not fitted with bomb 
racks.2 
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anointed as the creators of a revolutionary new 
system of air-ground cooperation. This was not 
quite accurate. Their ideas were not new, but they 
had been the first on the Allied side to implement 
the concepts successfully. The American airmen 
became disciples of the British doctrine, not 
because of its originality, but because they could 
use its success to convince the Ground Forces of 
the utility of the new doctrine, something they 
had hitherto been unable to achieve. 
North Africa forced the Americans to 
overhaul their doctrine for air support. The 
result, published in July 1943, was War 
Department Field Manual 100-20, "Command 
and Employment of Air Power."5 The main ideas 
contained in FM 100-20 are explicitly stated in 
capital letters at the beginning of the manual: 
LAND POWER AND AIR POWER ARE CO-
EQUAL AND INTERDEPENDENT FORCES; 
NEITHER IS AN AUXILIARY OF THE OTHER... 
THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF AIR POWER 
IS ITS GREATEST ASSET. THIS FLEXIBILITY 
MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO EMPLOY THE 
WHOLE WEIGHT OF THE AVAILABLE AIR 
POWER AGAINST SELECTED AREAS IN 
TURN; SUCH CONCENTRATED USE OF THE 
AIR STRIKING FORCE IS A BATTLE WINNING 
FACTOR OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE. 
CONTROL OF AVAILABLE AIR POWER MUST 
BE CENTRALIZED AND COMMAND MUST BE 
EXERCISED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE 
COMMANDER IF THIS INHERENT 
FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO DELIVER A 
KNOCKOUT BLOW ARE TO BE FULLY 
EXPLOITED. THEREFORE, THE COMMAND 
OF AIR AND GROUND FORCES IN A THEATER 
OF OPERATIONS WILL BE VESTED IN THE 
SUPERIOR COMMANDERS CHARGED WITH 
THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN 
THE THEATER, WHO WILL EXERCISE 
COMMAND OF AIR FORCES THROUGH THE 
AIR FORCE COMMAND AND COMMAND OF 
GROUND FORCES THROUGH THE GROUND 
FORCE COMMANDER. THE SUPERIOR 
COMMANDER WILL NOT ATTACH ARMY AIR 
FORCES TO UNITS OF THE GROUND FORCES 
UNDER HIS COMMAND EXCEPT WHEN SUCH 
GROUND FORCES ARE OPERATING 
INDEPENDENTLY OR ARE ISOLATED BY 
DISTANCE OR LACK OF COMMUNICATIONS.6 
The statements contained in FM 100-20 were a 
del iberate a t t empt to avoid the pitfalls 
experienced in North Africa. The co-equal status 
of the Army and the Air Force, the principle of 
centralized control and the flexibility of tactical 
air power are dominant themes in this manual. 
Operations during November and December 
served to show that a large gap existed between 
American air doctr ine and its pract ica l 
employment. FM 31-35 seems to have been 
virtually discarded once actual operations began. 
Army Ground Force commanders moved quickly 
to assert their dominance over the Air Forces and 
received very little opposition. The ad hoc system 
which developed by the end of 1942 proved to 
be quite ineffective. But, there was hope on the 
horizon. The British system of CAS that evolved 
in the Middle East between General B.L. 
Montgomery, commander of 8th Army, and Air 
Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, commander 
of the Western Desert Air Force, had proven 
enormous ly successfu l . With no other 
alternatives, the Americans turned to the British 
for help. 
In early 1943, Coningham was promoted to 
command the Northwest African Tactical Air 
Forces (NATAF) and he made his presence felt 
immediately. The NATAF was designed to provide 
air support to each of the three armies operating 
in Africa. No longer were his units to be used in 
defensive missions. The air umbrella was 
discontinued and the control of aircraft was 
removed from First Army and II Corps. 
Henceforth, all requests for air support had to 
be made through Coningham. Fighters and 
fighter-bombers began flying offensive missions 
aimed at destroying the Luftwaffe and gaining air 
superiority. As well, the emphasis on ground 
targets shifted. Tanks were declared to be 
unprofitable targets due to the difficulty, and 
expense, of attempts to destroy them. Instead, 
enemy troop concen t r a t ions and motor 
transport, targets well within the capabilities of 
the airmen, became the preferred targets.3 
Though the changes took time to make an impact, 
the NATAF was to become a very effective force 
under Coningham's direction.4 
Coningham and his NATAF were to have a 
significant effect on the development of American 
tactical air doctrine. Though it was true that 
American airmen had developed a sound doctrine 
of their own, they had been unable to convince 
the Army Ground Forces of the applicability of 
their ideas. As a result, the Air Force found itself 
being utilized by Ground Force commanders in 
a manner that did not take full advantage of the 
air weapon. This was where the British influence 
was critical. Coningham and Montgomery were 
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consultation or approval sought from General 
McNair and the Army Ground Forces. This 
preemptive move, considered by some to be a 
"Declaration of Independence," tended to support 
the view that the Air Force had only its best 
interests in mind and FM 100-20 was merely an 
attempt to gain freedom of action from the Army. 
In spite of this opposition, the new doctrine 
quickly became part of the curriculum at Army 
ground schools.8 
FM 100-20 provided the structure for the air 
support system that the Americans went with into 
Normandy. However, the limitations of this new 
doctrine were quickly exposed and within days 
of the invasion a new system began to evolve 
which proved very successful, but was quite a 
departure from FM 100-20. 
Normandy and the Battlefield 
Evolution of Close Air Support 
In the early morning of 6 June 1944 the Allies launched the largest amphibious landing in 
history. By the end of the day, a foothold on the 
continent had been achieved. However, it would 
take nearly two months of intense combat to 
break out of the beachhead and a further six 
weeks to send the Germans into a headlong 
retreat towards Germany. During this period, IX 
Tactical Air Command (IX TAC) in cooperation 
with the First United States Army (FUSA) evolved 
an effective system of close air support that 
greatly facilitated the winning of the war. 
FM 100-20 also introduced the concept of the 
prioritization of the missions of the tactical air 
force. The first phase of operations was to gain 
air superiority. Without this pre-condition, the 
operational advantage passed to the enemy. The 
second priority was interdiction or the prevention 
of hostile troops and supplies from moving 
within, or to, the battle area. Once these first two 
missions had been accomplished, attention could 
focus on third phase operations - the support of 
ground forces in the immediate battle area. The 
manual stated, "in the zone of contact, missions 
against hostile units are most difficult to control, 
are most expensive and are, in general, least 
effective. Targets are small, well-dispersed, and 
difficult to locate...Only at critical times are 
contact zone missions profitable."7 
The arrangement of the three main missions 
of the tactical air force makes sense but only in a 
conceptual manner. The attainment of air 
superiority was an essential prerequisite for other 
close air support operations. However, the strict 
ranking of missions seemed to preclude the 
various operations from taking part along side 
each other. This, combined with the fact that close 
support of the army was relegated to third 
priority, left many army commanders wondering 
how committed the air force was to its support. 
This question could not be answered until the 
Allies turned their attention to continental 
Europe. 
The acceptance of FM 100-20 did not happen 
immediately. The new manual caused quite a stir 
when it was published because there was no 
A P-47 Thunderbolt takes off from a frontline landing strip after being refuelled and rearmed by mechanics 
of the 9th Air Force Service Command. The strip is still in process of construction and work goes on despite 
aircraft landing and taking off. (USAF Photo PRO HQ 44-1533) 
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During the planning for Operation "Neptune," 
special arrangements were made for the control 
of aircraft on tactical air missions. Hillingdon 
House in Uxbridge, England became the focal 
point for these operations. A key component of 
this control centre - the Operations Cell - was 
responsible for the coordination of close air 
support. It received requests from US Air 
Support Parties and British Visual Control Posts 
or from ground commanders directly. These 
requests were evaluated and either refused or 
passed on to the appropriate air operations 
room. The Operations Cell also had the authority 
to develop air support missions on its own 
initiative and was responsible for setting and 
adjusting the bombline based on information 
provided by the other two cells. The facilities at 
Hillingdon House comprised the U.K.-based half 
of the air support system.9 
In many respects, the duties of the Combined 
Control Centre at Uxbridge were duplicated 
onboard the headquarters ships USS Ancon and 
USS Bayfield off the French coast.10 The principal 
role of the air representatives on board was to 
direct offensive air operations in support of the 
a rmy on the b e a c h e s . The Senior Air 
10 
Ninth US Air Force fighter pilots, operating from one 
of the first airstrips in Normandy, join an early 
morning chowline for breakfast. The flightline of 
P-47 Thunderbolts is visible in the background. 
Representative on each ship acted as air advisor 
to the commanding generals of the army, corps 
and divisions engaged in operations. All air 
cooperation requests that were sent direct to 
Uxbridge by Air Support Parties attached to the 
troops ashore were to be monitored and those 
that were deemed unnecessary, wasteful or too 
dangerous, were vetoed. As well, the air 
representatives could originate air support 
requests and convey information on weather and 
the bombline to the Air Force.11 The Senior Air 
Representative also had a direct role to play in 
battle. 
Upon arrival in the invasion area, American 
fighter-bombers were required to check in with 
the Ancon or Bayfield prior to executing their 
attack. This served two functions. First, it allowed 
the pilot to be briefed on the latest target 
conditions and to be given a final vector or visual 
landmark to the target. The second function was 
to provide the air representative the opportunity 
to divert aircraft to targets of greater importance. 
These usually consisted of fleeting targets of 
opportunity reported by air support parties or 
by tactical reconnaissance flights.12 
The air support system created for the 
invasion was highly centralized. Primary control 
of the aircraft rested with the air commanders 
at Hillingdon House. The air representatives 
located on the headquarters ships exercised 
some mission control but were generally limited 
to providing pilots with a final briefing. The air 
support rendered during the landings would 
consist primarily of pre-arranged missions. 
Though the British did not employ their Visual 
Control Posts during the actual assault, the 
Americans sent their equivalent Air Support 
Parties ashore with each of the Regimental 
Combat Teams. However, the role of these parties 
was to be extremely limited. The ASPs were 
prohibited from using their VHF radios to contact 
aircraft overhead unless they received prior 
authorization to do so. The restrictions on 
communications were so severe that the ASPs 
were not even permitted to signal aircraft that 
were attacking friendly troops or attacking the 
wrong target. The rationalization behind these 
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the troops. If no requests had been received by 
the end of the patrol, the squadrons had orders 
to attack pre-arranged targets before heading 
home.15 During the afternoon and early evening 
of 6 June, 13 requests were made. Five were 
refused for various reasons including weather, 
impending darkness, the unavailability of aircraft 
and coverage by other missions. The remaining 
eight requests were accepted and a total of 11 
missions resulted. The majority of the missions 
were directed against gun batter ies near 
Carentan, Maisy, Isigny and Bayeux. The 
importance of these targets prompted Major-
General Leonard T. Gerow, Commanding General 
V Corps, to contact the headquarters of Ninth 
Air Force personally and request, "continuous 
fighter bomber support to search out and attack 
enemy artillery firing on the beaches."16 This 
entreaty was fully endorsed by General Elwood 
R. Quesada, Commander of IX TAC. A series of 
attacks on the coastal batteries resulted in 
numerous direct hits being reported and the 
missions were considered to be generally 
successful. Other request missions carried out 
included armed reconnaissance of the three main 
roads leading from Coutances, and attacks on a 
number of convoys, trains and other targets of 
opportunity.17 
orders is not immediately understandable but 
historian W.A. Jacobs postulates that the Air 
Force did not want their forward attack control 
to develop into target control, and thus erode the 
doctrine which espoused a centralized system of 
air support.13 
The first targets hit by the fighter-bombers 
of Ninth Air Force on the morning of 6 June were 
two coastal gun batteries, six bridges and a rail 
embankment. The gun batteries, located behind 
Omaha beach at Maisy and Gefosse-Fontenay, 
were capable of disrupting the American 
landings. The result of the air strikes, by 18 and 
15 aircraft respectively, were reported as "good" 
and "excellent." The bridge-busting attacks in the 
Cherbourg Peninsula destroyed three of the 
targets and registered hits on the remaining 
spans.14 
Following the completion of the pre-arranged 
support on D-day, the fighter-bombers of the 
Ninth Air Force were made available to meet any 
immediate needs of the Ground Forces. The plan 
called for at least one squadron to patrol each 
beach throughout the day. They were under the 
control of the headquarters ships which could 
direct them to targets impeding the advance of 
Ground crew refuel and rearm a P~47 in preparation for another sortie in Normandy. 
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that day, Ninth Air Force issued General Order 
No.158 which authorized IX TAC to assume 
operational control of all fighter-bombers arriving 
on the continent. This did not mean much at that 
point since no groups were yet based in France. 
There were, however, a number of operational 
airfields used by aircraft on roulement, a 
technique which allowed aircraft to take-off in 
England, carry out a mission and then land at 
one of the French airstrips to refuel and rearm 
and then fly another mission. The fighter-
bombers would continue to stage out of France 
until the end of the day when they would return 
to England for the night. Roulement allowed for 
a much shorter turnaround time between 
missions than if they had to return to England 
following the expenditure of their bombs, fuel and 
ammunition.22 
The activation of Advanced Headquarters, IX 
TAC, along with the 70th Fighter Wing at Au Gay, 
France marked the beginning of the transition 
period from the assault air support organization 
to a close partnership between IX TAC and FUSA. 
The headquarters of FUSA was located only a 
hedgerow away from that of IXTAC. On 13 June, 
IX TAC began to exercise operational control 
through the 70th Fighter Wing but it was five days 
later that the organization gained its relative 
independence. Until that time all air support 
requests continued to go to Uxbridge. This soon 
changed: 
Effective midnight 17-18 June this Headquarters 
[IXTAC advanced] in conjunction with 1st Army 
will a ssume responsibility for designating 
bomblines. Will also assume responsibility for 
operating Air Support Net. Submitting those 
requests that cannot be met by local resources 
to Ninth AF.23 
This marked a major change in the provision 
of close air support. First Army would now have 
to go no further than a couple hundred yards to 
the control centre where air support was 
arranged. The Advanced Headquarters of IX TAC 
assumed control for filtering and acting upon air 
support requests. Ninth Air Force would only be 
involved in the process if IX TAC could not meet 
the requests with the aircraft at its disposal. 
Generally, this meant the use of medium 
bombers. For those additional resources, 
requests would continue to go to Hillingdon 
House.24 
The request missions flown on the first day 
of the invasion were quite successful. However, 
even at this early stage a number of problems 
were apparent. As the official Air Force History 
states, "The first day's experience disclosed that 
the control mechanism centred at Uxbridge, 
however logically it may have been planned, was 
too involved in operation for the speedy provision 
of air support."18 Though the Overlord plan called 
for a continuous rotation of alert squadrons, 
these proved insufficient to meet the needs of the 
situation. A greater number of squadrons had to 
be put at the disposal of the air representatives 
on the headquarters ships. This problem was 
compounded by a number of communications 
difficulties. The VHF radios sent ashore with the 
ASPs (SCR-284s with a maximum range of 25 
miles) could not reach the Combined Control 
Center at Uxbridge. As a result, their requests 
had to be passed on by the headquarters ships. 
As well, there were intermittent communications 
failures on board one of the headquarters ships.19 
These problems resulted in an expeditious 
reorganization of the air support system shortly 
after the invasion. To streamline the system of 
target selection, the Senior Air Representative 
aboard the headquarters ships Ancon was 
provided with a greater number of alert 
squadrons to which he could assign targets based 
on requests from Air Support Parties, tactical 
reconnaissance reports and other sources. The 
Senior Air Representative could also direct the 
squadrons to undertake armed reconnaissance 
behind the German lines to seek targets of 
opportunity.20 
In the initial period following the invasion, 
tactical air operations continued in the pattern 
set on D-day. The number of air support requests 
increased gradually, but mission acceptance 
depended on the weather. Air operations were 
severely limited by weather on 8 June and totally 
scrubbed the next day. It must be remembered 
that all Ninth Air Force fighter-bombers were 
based in England during this period. Good 
weather was needed on both sides of the Channel 
for operations to be carried out. Weather became 
less of a problem once a significant number of 
fighter-bomber groups were moved to France, 
however, it always remained a factor.21 
On 10 June the second step towards a more 
decentralized air support system was taken. On 
12 
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol8/iss1/2
in policy. As the campaign progressed the 
improved communications facilities combined 
with more experienced personnel to allow low 
priori ty p l anned miss ions and a rmed 
reconnaissance flights to be diverted and briefed 
in the air to meet SAP target requests. Following 
Operation "Cobra," SAP missions disappeared 
completely from the mission records as they were 
replaced by armoured column cover and armed 
reconnaissance flights. 
The Air Support Parties, discussed above, 
were an integral component of the air support 
system. The principle role of the ASP was to act 
as the conduit for all ground force air support 
requests. The ASPO worked closely with both 
the G-3 Air and the commander of the unit to 
which he was assigned. As a qualified flying 
officer, the ASPO brought with him an intimate 
knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of 
close support aircraft. In this capacity the ASPO 
acted as the Air Commander's representative on 
the division or corps staff. He advised the Ground 
Force commander on all matters pertaining to 
air support, in particular, the suitability of targets 
selected for attack.27 The ASP was equipped with 
a complete communications system to relay 
requests to the combined control centre. 
In the period following the capture of 
Cherbourg the Army and Air Force moved 
towards closer cooperation. By the middle of July 
it was standard practice for incoming flights to 
contact the ASPO about five minutes before they 
reached the target area. This allowed the pilots 
to be briefed on the latest target intelligence and 
be informed which coloured smoke would be 
used. Once the attack had been completed the 
flight or squadron leader would radio the results 
of his attack to the ASPO and thus provide the 
Army with the most up-to-date intelligence.28 The 
principle advantage of this evolution, or 
maturation, of the air support system was 
increased flexibility. No longer was it necessary 
to provide the pilots with a detailed pre-flight 
briefing. It was now possible for missions to be 
arranged very quickly, even while the aircraft were 
in the air. The pilots could be contacted by the 
ASPO and briefed on the location and nature of 
the target. When the aircraft arrived in the general 
area, the artillery would mark the exact targets 
to be attacked. This was a significant change from 
the manner in which operations were conducted 
during the early days of Overlord. 
13 
The activation of the combined IXTAC-FUSA 
headquarters on 17 June marked the start of 
the decentralization of the assault air support 
system. By the time of the operation to capture 
the Cherbourg Peninsula, the joint headquarters 
was in operation processing air support requests. 
However, it did not reach full stride until early 
July. At its heart was the combined operations 
room which acted as a collection point, filter and 
action centre for all air support requests. Three 
types of requests were processed: planned 
missions, request missions and immediate 
request missions. 
Planned missions were defined as sorties to 
be flown the next day or on succeeding days. They 
originated with the ground forces at either the 
divisional or corps level. Request missions were 
required on the same day, but the exact timing 
was not crucial. These requests followed the 
same channels from the division or corps to the 
combined operations room. The decision on the 
request was sent back along the communications 
network to keep the originating unit informed.25 
An immediate request mission was required 
as "soon as possible" (SAP) and action on the 
request took priority over other activities. The 
request was sent directly from the Air Support 
Party Officer (ASPO) at Division or Corps to the 
FUSA G-3 Air. This process could be expedited 
by the diversion of airborne aircraft from less 
important targets or by keeping aircraft and 
crews on a high state of readiness at their 
airfields. General Quesada reported that in most 
cases, missions requested SAP required 60-80 
minutes from the time of the request until the 
arrival of aircraft over the target.26 Air support 
request records for the first week in July reveal 
that the response times were much longer. On 
average it took 88 minutes from the time a 
request was submitted until the ground unit 
received notification on the status of the request. 
Aircraft did not actually reach the target until an 
average of nearly four hours after the request was 
made. This, however, was a huge improvement 
compared to the period immediately following 
D-Day when SAP missions were not a realistic 
option. As the month of July progressed, the 
number of SAP missions recorded in the daily 
operational summaries declined significantly 
while the response times improved. The decline 
in SAP missions was not due to a reduced need 
for air support but rather was caused by a shift 
7
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American troops poised to attack. This area, 
south of the St. Lo-Périers highway, was 250 
yards wide and 7,000 yards long. The fighter-
bombers were followed by heavy and medium 
bomber attacks. They saturated the target area, 
extending 1500 yards beyond die fighter-bomber 
target area. Unfortunately there were short 
bombings which caused over 600 friendly 
casualties and a great deal of disorganization 
among the waiting troops.31 
Despite the confusion, the ground attack 
began only slightly late, at 1100 hours. At the 
same time, a second wing of fighter-bombers 
commenced its attacks. It concentrated the attack 
on the same strip of land. IX TAC judged the 
results of its missions to be "excellent and beyond 
our expectations."32 
Following the initial fighter-bomber attacks, 
units of IX TAC were allocated to support VII 
Corps for the remainder of the day. A number of 
immediate request missions were flown against 
ammun i t i on and petrol d u m p s , t roop 
concentrations, and gun positions. Two church 
steeples being used as observations posts by the 
Germans were destroyed. A number of armed 
reconnaissance and interdiction missions were 
also carried out to engage and destroy a variety 
of targets ranging from motor transport, tanks, 
and horse-drawn vehicles to a number of bridge 
and railway targets. At the end of the day, P-47s 
from the 366th and 368th Fighter Groups 
deployed a series of delayed action bombs on 
the crossroads around Coutances. The bombs 
were fused to detonate after one to twelve hours 
in the hope of disrupting German convoys using 
the cover of darkness.33 
"Cobra" was the turn ing point in the 
Normandy campaign . The mass ive 
bombardment paved the way for the breakout 
by the US armoured divisions and forced the 
Germans to re-evaluate their position in France. 
This was recognized within days by FUSA. On 
28 July, Bradley wrote to Eisenhower to express 
his optimism: 
Major-General Elwood "Pete" Quesada (right) sits in 
a jeep with Air Chief Marshal Sir Trqfford Leigh-
Mallory during a visit to a 9th Air Force station in 
Normandy. 
The full capabilities of the evolving air 
support system were shown by an incident which 
occurred on the evening of 17 July. In the push 
to capture St. Lo, the 116th Infantry Regiment 
of the 29th Division found itself low on 
ammunit ion and facing a strong German 
counterattack. The first small probing attacks 
were repulsed with the aid of artillery fire, but a 
force of enemy tanks could be seen preparing 
for a renewed assault. At about 2000 hours a 
request for air support was sent to IX TAC. The 
call was answered in just over an hour by a 
squadron of Thunderbolts from the 404th Fighter 
Bomber Group based at Airfield A-5 in Chippelle, 
France. The pilots received their final briefing in 
the air from the ASPO of the 29th Division, Major 
Horace B. Wetherall, and spent 60 minutes over 
the target area bombing all potential targets. The 
air strikes were made immediately in front of 
the American lines and numerous German 
soldiers ran into the American lines to avoid 
being bombed. Though the pilots reported seeing 
no tanks and claimed bomb hits on only one 
vehicle and a house, Major-General C.H. Gerhart, 
Commanding General, 29th Infantry Division, 
credited the attacks with a major role in repelling 
the counterattack. It was through the close 
coordination between the squadron and the 
ASPO that the pilots were quickly briefed and 
kept informed of the American positions so they 
could make their attacks dangerously close to 
the troops they were protecting.29 The support of 
the 29th Division by IX TAC was just one of six 
missions flown in support of XIX Corps on 17 
July.30 
At 0938 hours on 25 July attacks by eight 
squadrons of Ninth Air Force fighter-bombers 
opened Operation "Cobra," a major offensive 
designed to crack through the main line of 
German resistance. The fighter-bomber target 
was the slender band immediately opposite the 
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A P-47 flies low over the tank column it is supporting. 
time the aircraft reached the target area. The 
request system had to adapt to a rapidly changing 
environment. 
By most accounts it was General Quesada 
who came up with the idea for ACC.35 He had to 
persuade Bradley to assign him a Sherman tank 
so he could conduct tests to determine the 
feasibility of the concept. It took a while for IX 
TAC to get its tank. The first tank was mistakenly 
delivered to the 9th Armoured Division by an 
ordnance officer who believed that the destination 
"IX TAC" on his orders was a typo. On the second 
try at delivery, the tanks were refused at IX TAC 
headquarters by an Air Force officer who was 
unaware of Quesada's plan. It took a third 
attempt before the situation was straightened 
out.36 The concept of ACC was tested starting on 
19 July when a team from IX TAC arrived with 
their modified tank at 2nd Armoured Division's 
Combat Command A to begin trials. Within a 
week the new technique had been proven and 
was ready for operational deployment.37 
15 
To say that the personnel of the First Army 
Headquarters is riding high tonight is putting it 
mildly. Things on our front really look good... 
This operation could not have been the success 
it has been without such close cooperation of 
the Air. In the first place, the bombardment 
which we gave them last Tuesday [July 25] was 
apparently highly successful even though we did 
suffer m a n y c a s u a l t i e s o u r s e l v e s . The 
cooperation of Quesada's IX TAC Air Command 
has been outstanding. He has kept formations 
over the advancing columns continuously.34 
Bradley alludes to the introduction of a new 
tactic in the provision of close air support which 
changed the pattern of operations - Armoured 
Column Cover (ACC). 
The planners of Operation "Cobra" were 
concerned that they could not provide close air 
support to the mobile tank columns once they 
had broken through. To that point in the 
campaign, the most effective air support was 
during periods of static warfare. The relatively 
slow speed with which air support requests were 
processed could make them out of date by the 
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Support Party Officer attached to Combat 
Command A of the 2nd Armoured Division from 
22 July to 6 August 1944. During his time with 
the division he was very impressed with the 
results obtained through the use of ACC. He 
compared the role of the ASPO to that of the 
artillery forward observer. The commander of 
Combat Command A, Brigadier-General Maurice 
Rose, was very skeptical of the role of close 
support aircraft after being bombed repeatedly 
by friendly aircraft in Italy. However, Zimmerman 
reported that in his experience the accuracy of 
the supporting fighter-bombers had been 
excellent. He attributed the success to the ability 
of the ASPO to direct the aircraft right onto the 
target.41 The G-3 Air of FUSA was equally lavish 
in his praise of ACC. He credited the new system 
with the destruction of over 2,000 motor vehicles, 
200 tanks and 80 artillery pieces in the first week 
following its implementation. As well, ACC was 
responsible for disrupting the movement of 
German reserves, destroying the retreating 
columns and ensuring the continued success of 
the breakthrough.4 2 The FUSA Report on 
Operations stated that ACC produced results, 
"far beyond all expectations..." 
The results obtained by the employment of the 
tank-air team In mobile, fast moving situations 
are recognized as being an o u t s t a n d i n g 
achievement in air-ground cooperation and 
represent the development of an unbeatable 
combination.43 
T h e N i n t h Air F o r c e w a s n o l e s s e b u l l i e n t i n i t s 
p r a i s e of ACC: 
...the outstanding development in connection 
with the rendering of direct support by the Ninth 
Air Force has been the establishment of full 
cooperation between Fighter Bombers and 
armoured columns.44 
Close cooperation between the air and ground 
became the norm rather than the exception. On 
27 July, Combat Command B of 2nd Armoured 
Division was racing south in an attempt to 
encircle the retreating German forces. The 
s p e a r h e a d was being led by the 82nd 
Reconnaissance Battalion. In general, light 
resistance was being met. However, at the town 
of Quibou a German roadblock was encountered. 
In a model of combined operations, a detachment 
from the reconnaissance unit kept pressure on 
the front of the posi t ion while ano the r 
detachment attempted to outflank it. They 
The concept of armoured column cover was 
simple. An army crew manned a Sherman tank 
which contained a VHF radio (type SCR 522) run 
by a division air support party officer. This tank 
operated at the front of an advancing armoured 
column. In support of the column, and in direct 
contact with it, was a flight of four fighter-
bombers. The air-ground team worked very 
closely together. The tank commander benefitted 
from the air cover in two ways. First, he could 
use the aircraft as an immediate source of 
information. The pilots could be asked to scout 
ahead of the column and locate areas of enemy 
resistance. The pilots would also communicate 
anything they saw that could be a possible hazard 
to the ground forces. The second, and more 
revolutionary innovation of ACC was the 
delegation of target control to the commander of 
the armoured combat command. Any targets that 
blocked the path of the armoured column could 
be assigned to the orbiting aircraft. These targets 
would then be immediately attacked. If the target 
was larger than the flight could handle or if the 
aircraft expended their bombs, ammunition or 
fuel, additional aircraft could quickly be 
summoned. Successive flights of aircraft would 
provide cover during daylight hours for the 
column. Each flight would remain on station for 
30 to 90 minutes. It would then be replaced by 
another flight. Besides answering the requests 
of the armoured column, the ACC flight was free 
to seek out and destroy targets of opportunity.38 
Armoured column cover was used for the first 
time on 26 July, the day after the launch of 
"Cobra." On that day 75 ACC missions were 
dispatched comprised of over 300 aircraft. Only 
three did not complete their missions. The next 
day an even greater effort of over 100 missions 
was mounted.39 
The scale of air effort put forth by IX TAC in 
the period following "Cobra" was enormous. 
From 26 July to 31 July, the Command executed 
9,185 sorties. To put this effort in perspective, 
the average number of sorties per day during the 
month of July was 489. Following "Cobra" an 
average of 1,312 sorties were flown each day. A 
significant proportion of those sorties were 
committed to ACC.40 
From the start, ACC was very well received 
by both the air and the ground. Lieutenant-
Colonel James L. Zimmerman was an Air 
16 
10
Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol8/iss1/2
Scenes of destruction in the Roncey Pocket. Top: A German half-track (likely overturned by aerial bombs) 
and a knocked-out Panzer Mark IV tank bear silent witness to a row of German graves. Above left: A French 
farm cart and an American dispatch rider pass by smashed German transport just outside of Roncey. Above 
right: Wrecked German armour and transport in the square at Roncey. 
Tactical air operations in the period following 
the breakout were not limited to ACC missions. 
There were still a wide variety of missions taking 
place including planned, reques t and a rmed 
reconnaissance missions. The request missions 
most often originated w i t h infantry divisions that 
were not accorded the privilege of ACC. This was 
partly due to the fact that aircraft were busy with 
other tasks , b u t the pr imary reason infantry 
divisions did not get ACC was the belief that their 
air suppor t needs could be met th rough other 
channels . There is no doubt tha t the infantry 
c o m m a n d e r would have loved to have t he 
flexibili ty i m p a r t e d by ACC, b u t i n m o s t 
si tuations infantry actions were of a more static 
na tu r e t han a rmoured operat ions. As a resul t 
time was not as critical a factor and mos t air 
s u p p o r t n e e d s cou ld b e m e t t h r o u g h t h e 
established planned and request channels . 
An example of the symbiotic n a t u r e of the 
air a n d the g round forces occur red on the 
afternoon of 29 July . The lightning advance of 
17 
received artillery support from the self-propelled 
guns of the 78th Armoured Field Battalion and 
air suppor t from a squadron of IX TAC P-47s 
tasked to fly ACC for Combat Command B. 
German resis tance crumbled in the face of this 
concerted attack.45 
Numerous accounts attest to the effectiveness 
of ACC. In one case a single Sherman tank found 
itself su r rounded by 13 German t anks . Its call 
for help was quickly answered by a flight of four 
Thunderbo l t s . The air a t t a cks were able to 
distract the German armour long enough to allow 
the Sherman to beat a hasty retreat.46 In another 
incident, t a n k s of Combat Command A, 2nd 
Armoured Division were blocked by a German 
force loca ted nea rby . The divisional ASPO 
contacted IX TAC flight located overhead to 
reques t an at tack. The aircraft made repeated 
passes over the target, so close that it made the 
ASPO very nervous. However, he reported that , 
"not a single bul le t h i t ou r t a n k s , a n d the 
resistance was knocked out."47 
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the experience of the North African campaigns. 
The result was FM 100-20. Normandy showed 
how difficult, if not impossible, was the task of 
translating doctrine into practice. The general 
framework was useful, but experience rather than 
doctrine became the engine which drove 
improvements in the system of tactical air 
support used by First US Army and IX TAC. 
The Americans began the Normandy 
campaign with a system of air support that was 
very centralized. All requests for air support had 
to be routed through headquarters in England. 
The system was so strict that Air Support Parties 
were prohibited from speaking directly to aircraft 
overhead. As operations progressed and the level 
of experience grew the system was gradually 
decentralized. In return, the quality of support 
increased. The pinnacle of decentralization was 
reached with the introduction of Armoured 
Column Cover after Operation "Cobra." Air 
support requests no longer had to be sent back 
to a combined operations room but could be 
immediately filled by a flight of aircraft working 
closely with the armoured unit below. The 
concept of ACC went against many of the 
principles contained in FM 100-20. Although the 
air commander retained overall control, 
individual ACC missions were used in the "penny-
packet" manner condemned in North Africa. As 
well as primarily operating in the zone of contact 
where FM 100-20 considered activity to be 
unprofitable, ACC went against the doctrine and 
delegated mission and target priorities to the 
local ground force commander. 
Condi t ions , however, had changed 
subs t an t i a l l y s ince 1942 -1943 . Vast 
improvements in communications, control 
mechanisms, aircraft and coordination between 
ground and air units now made ACC a viable 
mission. It should be noted that ACC, though a 
type of combat air patrol, was very different from 
the defensive missions flown in North Africa. ACC 
was by definition offensive in nature. Rather than 
waiting for the enemy to come to them, aircraft 
on ACC missions sought out their targets. In 
many cases the defensive patrols in North Africa 
intercepted no enemy aircraft or were otherwise 
ineffective. The great value of ACC was two-fold 
- first was its ability to provide timely information 
to the ground forces. The benefits of having an 
eye-in-the-sky in close communications cannot 
be underestimated. Secondly, putting aside 
2nd Armoured Division's Combat Command B 
had allowed it to outflank the German forces in 
the Roncey area by the night of 28 July. This 
placed the unit directly in the path of the 
retreating German forces. With pressure from the 
north applied by the 3rd and 4th Armoured 
Divisions, the Germans found themselves in 
danger of being cut-off. During the night they tried 
to break free but were unable to get by the cordon 
set up by Combat Command B. The next day a 
flight from the 405th Fighter Bomber Group on 
an armed reconnaissance mission found a huge 
concentration of German traffic, in places 
bumper-to-bumper, lined up around Roncey 
trying to escape the pocket. One pilot estimated 
there were an estimated 500 vehicles trapped. 
Between 1510 and 2140 hours aircraft from IX 
TAC took turns attacking the mass. It was 
described as a "fighter-bomber's paradise." To 
add to the chaos, American artillery, tanks and 
tank destroyers fired at the trapped enemy. When 
it was all over, any chance at a German breakout 
had evaporated. A ground investigation later 
found over 100 tanks and 250 other vehicles in 
various stages of destruction and scores more 
abandoned intact. The reduction of the enemy 
forces in the Roncey pocket was accomplished 
by a combination of air attack, direct anti-tank 
fire and indirect artillery fire. Cooperation 
between the air and the ground could achieve 
results that neither could accomplish on their 
own.48 
In August, close air support continued to be 
the primary focus of operations by IX TAC. It is 
notable that IX TAC played a major role in 
stemming the German counterattack at Mortain 
in the second week of August, and then 
contributed a large number of sorties to the 
destruction of German forces trapped in the 
Falaise-Argentan pocket. These operations were 
a crucial component of the Allied success in 
Normandy, and they showed the growing ease 
with which the Ground and Air Forces worked 
together. There were no major advances in the 
system of cooperation in August, only a growing 
competence within the existing system. 
Conclusion 
Prior to the start of operations in Normandy, a doctrine for air suppor t evolved from 
American prewar ideas of tactical air power, and 
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successes such as the Roncey Pocket, ACC was 
most effective in suppressing, rather than 
destroying, the enemy. Aircraft such as the 
Thunderbolt carried great destructive power in 
the form of bombs, rockets, napalm and machine 
guns, but rarely were they able to focus this power 
in the manner that has been credited to them. 
The effectiveness of ACC accrued from the close 
partnership of air and ground forces. When an 
armoured column found its way blocked, its 
ability to proceed depended on the timely 
intervention of air power which more often than 
not would mask rather than destroy an enemy 
position allowing the ground forces to either 
bypass, or close and destroy the position. 
While the doctrine of close air support was 
changing, so too was the playing field. In North 
Africa the Luftwaffe was a significant factor. In 
Normandy it was not. In North Africa the Allies 
were chronically short of aircraft, men, supplies 
and other essentials. In Normandy, by the 
standards of 1942-43, there was an abundance 
of almost everything. These two factors alone 
accounted for much of the change. It was also 
significant that the Air Force no longer considered 
it probable that it would be engulfed by the Army. 
The air force was prepared to endorse a more 
decentralized air support system (ie. a system 
over which they exercised less control) in order 
to improve its efficiency. By no accounts had the 
perfect air support system been created by the 
end of the fighting in Normandy. What had 
evolved, however, was an efficient system that 
allowed the Air and Ground Forces to form an 
effective working relationship. Neither side 
completely abandoned its hopes for dominance 
or independence, but together they had learned, 
under less-than-ideal circumstances, how best 
to work together. 
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